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National Aggregates and Individual Disaffiliation: 
An International Study 
 
Abstract 
Using a dataset of 15,000 subjects from 32 western countries, the current 
study examines individuals who were raised in a certain religion and at some 
stage of their lives left it. Currently, they define their religious affiliation as 
‘no religion’. A battery of explanatory variables (country-specific, personal 
attributes and marriage variables) was employed to test for determinants of 
this decision. It was found that the tendency of individuals to leave their 
religion is strongly correlated with the degree of religious diversity of their 
country and with their spouse's religious characteristics. Moreover, personal 
socio-demographic features seem to be less relevant. 
Keywords: religion, national aggregates, disaffiliation. 
JEL Codes: Z12, J12, J13, D13 
 
1   Motivation  
Religion and economics are inter-related via various channels. With religion viewed as 
a dependent variable, it was claimed that religious participation and beliefs are affected 
by economic development and political institutions (McCleary and Barro, 2006); by 
country religious pluralism and government restrictions on religious conversion (Barro 
and Hwang, 2007); and by socio-economic personal attributes, such as education 
(Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2004; McCleary, 2006 and Barro and Hwang, 2007). In a 
study of 40 countries, Barro and Hwang (2007) did however not find significant effects 
of per-capita GDP, the presence of a state religion and the extent of religiosity on 
conversion rates.  
With religion viewed as an independent variable, it was claimed that religion (like other 
cultural traits) matters to important economic phenomena such as educational 
attainments (Mulligan, 1999; Landes, 2000; Black et al., 2005; Fan, 2008); labor force   3
participation (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005a); occupation (Long and Ferrie, 2005); income 
(Solon, 1992; Mulligan, 1997); marriage and inter-faith marriage (Bisin at al., 2004); 
fertility (Neuman and Ziderman, 1986; Blau, 1992; Fernandez and Fogli, 2005a, 2005b; 
Neuman, 2007; Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2007); economic growth (Mccleary, 2006); 
as well as attitudes which affect the labor market and other economic and social 
performance, such as attitudes of trust and risk (Dohmen et al., 2006), attitudes of 
cooperation (Cipriani et al., 2007), and work ethics, honesty and thrift (McCleary and 
Barro, 2006) and trust (Brañas et al. 2009). Guiso et al. (2003) provides a general 
overview of the effect of religiosity on economic attitudes. 
Hence, we observe an endogenous process: on the one hand, some studies state that 
secularization might be due to economic reasons but, on parallel, another set of papers 
concludes that secularization (decreasing religious activity) might also be the origin of 
economic phenomena. Our study explores the effect of national aggregates on 
secularization. 
The paper provides evidence about a relatively unexplored aspect of secularization: 
disaffiliation (converting out). We examine why individuals who were raised in a 
religion, left it at some stage in life and currently define their religious affiliation as ‘no 
religion’.
2 We will focus on the role of national aggregates (per-capita GDP; state-
religion; churchgoing and prayer averages; religious pluralism; and residence in a 
European country) on individual religious decision making. In order to arrive at net 
effects of national aggregates, personal attributes of the respondent, his family of origin 
and his spouse will be controlled for. 
                                                 
2  The terms 'converting out' and 'disaffiliation' will be used (interchangeably) for individuals who were 
raised in a religion and now define their denomination as 'no religion'. It is obviously an extreme act of 
secularization.   4
The literature on ‘secularization’ and disaffiliation is large and extensive.
3 It covers 
diverse aspects such as: (i) differentiation of society's major institutions (law, politics, 
economy, education, etc.) from religious influence; (ii) rationalization (Wilson, 1966; 
Martin, 1978); (iii) demystification of all spheres of life; and (iv) less adherence to 
religious acts such as attendance of religious services and prayer. See Tschannen (1991) 
for an inventory of the elements of classic theories of secularization.
4 
Sommerville (1998) sorted out the different aspects of secularization and divided them 
into two categories: those presented (i) in terms of processes (like decline, 
differentiation, disengagement, rationalization); or (ii) in terms of aspects of life or 
levels of analyses (structural, cultural, organizational, individual). We refer to 
‘secularization’ as a decline in individual religious practice. More specifically, we focus 
on disaffiliation. 
In order to identify the individuals who stepped out of their religious affiliation and to 
find out what are the factors that significantly affected this drastic move, a battery of 
explanatory variables was employed. The set included: (i) country specific variables: 
pluralism index; existence of state-religion; national average level of mass attendance 
and of prayer; and finally, per-capita GDP; (ii)  personal attributes that include: 
childhood and parental religious background; socio-economic and demographic 
personal determinants; and beliefs; and (iii)  marriage effects: marital status and 
spouse’s religion (for married individuals).  
The data used for the empirical analysis were drawn from the module on National 
Identity of the 1998 International Social Survey Program (ISSP): Religion II. The ISSP 
                                                 
3 Weber (1930), Bruce (1992), Chaves (1994), Yamane (1997), and Sommerville (1998) are some basic 
references. 
4 Williams and Lawler (2001) developed the Religious Behaviors Scale. It was constructed based on ten 
items related to religious commitment and was then decomposed into two sub-scales: The Church 
Involvement Subscale and the Personal Faith Subscale.   5
is an ongoing effort devoted to cross-country research on national attitudes. It includes 
questions on attitudes, beliefs and opinions on various issues, as well as numerous 
questions regarding the individual’s socio-economic background, together with 
information on parents and spouses. 15,000 individuals were sampled all around the 
world.
5 
Most of these countries are predominantly Christian (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, 
and other Christian faiths); a small share of respondents grew up as Jews or as 
Moslems; and about 1% were raised in other no Christian religions (see Table 1 for 
details). The data cover the European and Australian continents as well North America.
6 
The African continent is excluded and South America and Asia are represented by a 
small number of countries (Chile, Japan, Israel and the Philippines). The research is 
therefore pertaining to Europe, North-America and Australia, and a few other countries. 
In addition, the more homogenous European sample is analyzed separately and results 
for the larger sample are compared with the results for the European sample. 
To conclude, this paper offers a new perspective of the growing body of literature on the 
phenomenon of secularization. 
2    Dataset, variables and methodology 
2.1. Sample and dataset 
The International Social Survey Program is an ongoing effort devoted to cross-country 
research on national attitudes. It includes questions on attitudes, beliefs and opinions on 
                                                 
5 The sample includes: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, France, West 
Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, Israel, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, New Zealand, 
Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The Czech 
Republic, The Netherlands, The Philippines, The Slovak Republic, and The United States. It appears that 
the samples of Australia, Cyprus and Israel do not include any respondent who disaffiliated. 
6 An interesting point relating to this is that historically, secularization finds its roots in the enlightenment 
movement of the 17
th and 18
th century in Europe and America, who were predominantly Christian.   6
various issues, as well as numerous questions regarding the individual’s socio-economic 
background, together with information on parents and spouses.  
The sample is composed of Christians: Catholics – 48.7%; Protestants – 23.7%; 
Orthodox – 7.2%; a small share of respondents are Jewish (4.3%) or  Moslem (1.1%); 
about 1.8% have other Christian religions and about 1.2% have other religions (e.g. 
Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu, Shinto); and 11.3% identify themselves as having ‘no religion’. 
Regressions were estimated using pooled country data, under the assumption that the 
effects of the independent variables are not different in the various countries included in 
the sample. The pooling of the data led to a very large sample (sample sizes within each 
of the countries were too small to allow a separate analysis for each country). Country 
specific variables were used to identify and control for country effects.
7 
The analysis is replicated for a reduced and more compact set of the European 
countries.  
2.2. Variables 
The dependent variable was defined using information derived from two questions: 
"What was your religion when you were a child?" and "What is your current religion?" 
It relates to disaffiliation and takes the value of 1 for respondents who were raised in a 
religion and currently claim to have 'no religion' and 0 otherwise (were raised in a 
religion and currently have the same religion or a different religion. Those who were 
raised in 'no religion' were excluded from the analysis).  
Several sets of variables were introduced in order to identify and explore the 
determinants of disaffiliation. 
Country-specific variables 
                                                 
7 Another option was to use fixed-effects regression models. The basic results for the core variables did 
not change when fixed-effects were used.   7
First, in order to capture possible differences in disaffiliation in European countries 
versus other countries due to different cultures (Japan, Israel, The Philippines, Chile, 
New-Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States) we define a dummy variable for 
respondents residing in European countries: 
  European country dummy 
Second, we focus on religious competition (pluralism) and the existence of a state-
religion (see Chaves and Gorski, 2001): 
  The P index represents religious pluralism (diversity) and is defined as P=1-HHI, 
where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration.
8 The larger P is, 
the more religiously diverse the country is said to be. 
  The existence of a state-religion.
9 
Additionally, we add two variables which reflect country religious adherence: 
  The country average level of church (religious services) attendance (on a scale 
of 1-to-6, ranging from not attending at all to attending at least once a week).
10  
  The country average level of private prayer (on a scale of 1-to-11, ranging from 
never to several times a day).  
Finally, to control the country's level development (see Weber, 1930; Chaves and Cann, 
1992) we add: 
                                                 






2 , the sum of squares of the shares of the country’s religious denominations. It 
follows that P ranges between 0 (if everyone belongs to the same religion) and (almost) 1 (if there are a 
large number of religions, each of which covers a negligible fraction of the population). See also 
Lieberson (1969) and Voas et al. (2002) who refer to the same diversity/pluralism index. 
9 Barro and McCleary (2005) provide a comprehensive country-by-country study on the adoption and 
abandonment of state-religions over time. 
 
10 The term 'church' is used as a generic term that relates to the relevant religious place of worship (e.g. 
also synagogue for Jews, mosque for Moslems, etc.). The religious rules of congregation vary between 
religions (e.g. many orthodox Jews congregate once or even twice a day while Christians congregate once 
a week).   8
  per-capita GDP. 
Personal attributes 
The ISSP-98 contains some basic socio-demographic questions for each responder: 
  Present age: Obviously, the more relevant variable is the age of disaffiliation 
and not the current age. Unfortunately, respondents were not asked when they 
converted out.
11 We use 4 categories for age: under 31 (reference group); 31-to-
45; 46-to-59; and 60 and above. 
  Education: last school attended: elementary (reference category); high school; 
and academic education institution. 
Interestingly the ISSP includes two questions about norms of behaviour:  
  One is related to extra-marital sexual relations [the question’s phrasing was: For 
a married person to have sexual relations with someone other than her/his 
husband or wife is: (1) always wrong; (2) almost always wrong; (3) wrong only 
sometimes; or (4) not wrong at all]. Those who chose the third or fourth options 
were defined as having a liberal view on this issue. 
  The other question refers to homosexual relations [Sexual relations between two 
adults of the same sex is: same four options as above]. Those who chose the 
third or fourth options were defined as having a liberal view on that issue.  
The basic idea is that individuals who are more liberal are more prone to convert-out 
and become non-religious. Additionally, churches condemn extra-marital and 
homosexual relations and therefore individuals who hold liberal views on these 
                                                 
11 Nevertheless, current age embodies cohort effects: Secularization was not common decades ago and 
has increased in recent years. Assuming that most individuals convert-out at their 20s or 30s, because 
young people are more revolutionary, it follows that older people (e.g. above the age of 60) belong to a 
cohort of a period when secularization was less common and therefore have a lower tendency to 
disaffiliate.   9
'unmoral' issues may feel 'rejected' by the church and consequently have a higher 
tendency to disaffiliate. 
Finally, the most important feature of the ISSP-98 is the battery of individual questions 
regarding religious performance: 
  Religious denomination in which the subject was educated. 
  Using information regarding the religious affiliation of the father and mother, we 
defined the variable: raised in a religious homogamous household, that equals 1 
if the father and mother had the same religion (when the respondent was a 
child). 
  Information on exposure to church (religious) services during childhood, that 
includes 9 alternative levels,
12 was used to define the dummy variable: intensive 
religious practice = 1, for original values of: 7 (attended almost every week), 8 
(every week), and 9 (several times a week).  
The ISSP also includes a number of questions about beliefs in some basic religious 
doctrines: 
  Belief in heaven. 
  Belief in hell. 
  Belief in miracles.  
The question: “Do you believe in heaven/hell/miracles” had four alternative answers: 
(1) yes, definitely; (2) yes, probably; (3) no, probably not; and (4) no, definitely not. 
Those who chose option four were defined as non-believers. It is assumed that non-
believers have a higher tendency to leave their religion.  
                                                 
12  The ISSP question is: "When you were 12 years old, how often did you attend religious services?" The 
options are: Never (1); once a year (2); one or two times a year (3); a few times a year (4); once a month 
(5); two or three times a month (6), almost every week (7); every week (8); several times a week (9).   10
Marriage effects 
For this variable we have three key measures: 
  Marital status (married=1; 0 otherwise). 
  Spouse has the same denomination as the respondent was raised in. 
  Spouse has 'no religion'. 
2.3. Method 
The dependent variable was a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the respondent was 
raised in a religion and currently has 'no religion' and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables were those variables described in the previous section.  
We estimated Logit 'Converting-Out' regressions for women and men. Given that the 
European dummy variable had a significant coefficient, expressing differences in 
disaffiliation between European and non-European countries, we ran separated 
regressions for the European sub-sample.
13  
3   Findings 
3.1. Descriptive statistics: Sample characteristics 
Before proceeding to report the results, the characteristics of the samples used for the 
regression analysis are described. Table 1 presents means of the variables used for the 
econometric analysis. They are presented for the female and male samples and a 
distinction is also made between the larger sample and the European sub-sample. 
The means are similar for the general sample and the European sub-sample. Gender 
differences are also small. Approximately 9% of the women and 14% of the men 
converted-out: they were raised within a religion and currently claim to have 'no 
religion'. The figures are slightly larger within the European countries (10.4% of the 
                                                 
13 The non-European sub-sample was too small for a separate regression.   11
women and 15.7% of the men). The somewhat lower percentage of women who 
converted-out is in line with theories and findings of other studies showing that women 
are generally more religious (Kelley, 1977; Roof, 1989; Sandomirsky and Wilson, 
1990; Sherkat, 1991; Loveland, 2003; Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2004, 2007).  
Interestingly, Shy (2007), who processed data from the World Christian Encyclopedia 
(Barrett et al., 2001) and calculated the percentage of secular people (non-religious and 
atheists combined) in Europe in the year 2000, arrived at a similar percentage around 
15% (Table 1, page 1130). 
The majority of respondents were raised in Christian denominations
14: About 56.1% of 
respondents were raised as Catholics, around 28.2% grew up as Protestants, and around 
7.6% as Orthodox. About 1.2% were Moslem, 4.3% Jewish (0.1% in Europe) and 2.7% 
had other religions.  
Focusing on those who converted-out, the distribution of their original denominations is 
the following: Catholic – 53.7%; Protestant – 39.9%; Orthodox – 2.9%; Jewish – 0.3%; 
Moslem - 0.3%; and 3% had other religions.  
The countries are not very diverse in terms of existing religions: A pluralism index of 
0.37 (0.33 in Europe) indicates limited diversity. Around one third of the countries have 
a state-religion. The average per-capita GDP in the sampled countries is 15-16 thousand 
US$. 
An examination of the average levels of religious practice shows that despite rapid 
secularization, the populations are still adhering to both mass services and even more so 
to prayer habits. The mass attendance average is above 2.1 on a scale of 1-to-6. The 
average prayer level is above 5.6 on a scale of 1-to-11.  
............. Insert Table 1 about here................. 
                                                 
14 Data reported on page 3 refers to current religion (not the one raised in).   12
Women seem to be more religious in terms of belief in the religious doctrines of life 
after death, heaven, hell and miracles. However, a considerable percentage of the two 
genders do not believe in these doctrines: about 32% (29% of the women and 36% of 
the men) do not believe in hell. Around 19% of the women and over 28% of the men do 
not believe in each of the other three doctrines. One can observe a kind of wishful 
believing: The percentage of non-believers in hell is much larger compared to non-
believers in the three 'positive' doctrines. Brañas-Garza, García-Munoz and Neuman 
(forthcoming) find that afterlife beliefs have a crucial role in religious performance for 
both females and males. 
An examination of childhood religious background shows that close to 90% of the 
participants grew up in households where the two parents belonged to the same 
denomination. Over 51% of respondents were exposed to intensive religious practice 
when they were aged 12 and attended church services on a regular basis (at least once a 
week).  
Focusing on individuals currently married, we observe that over 80% have a spouse 
with the same religious denomination that the respondent was raised in, and around 7% 
have a spouse that declares having 'no religion'. 
The socio-demographic characteristics of our sample are as follows: About a quarter of 
the sample are above the age of 60. Over 36% have an academic education (at least 
partial). 
'Married' is still the most common marital status: about 87% of respondents are married. 
Over 35% have liberal views regarding homosexual relations, but only about 15% think 
that extramarital sexual relations are acceptable. Interestingly, women are more liberal 
when it comes to homosexual relations and have a less liberal attitude towards 
extramarital sex relations. 
3.2. Regression results   13
Table 2 below presents Logit 'Converting-Out' regressions for women and men for both 
the whole sample and the European sub-sample. Recall that the dependent variable is 
dichotomous (taking the value 1 if the respondent was raised in a religion and currently 
has 'no religion' and 0 otherwise). The reported coefficients are the odd-ratios of the 
various variables. Table 3 summarizes the relevant regression results.  
We have found a positive significant coefficient of the 'European residence' dummy 
variable: European women have a higher tendency of 41% to convert out, compared to 
their non-European counterparts. The positive differential is even larger for European 
men (65%).  
Our data indicates that there is a clear and strong correlation between the religious 
pluralism of a country and the tendency of its population to convert-out and abandon 
any religious affiliation: More religiously diverse countries have much higher rates of 
disaffiliation.  
The effect of religious pluralism is much more pronounced in the European countries 
and for women, indicating differences between European countries and non-continental 
countries, as well as gender differences. We can therefore conclude that our findings do 
not support supply-side theories. Quite the contrary, we find clear evidence in favour of 
demand-side sociological approaches: A greater diversity does not stimulate greater 
religious participation but rather secularization.
15 Figure 1 (on the left) jointly plots the 
national means of converting-out and the pluralism index.  
***Figure 1 about here*** 
The stronger effects for Europe indicate that there are differences between European 
and non-European countries. Thus, demand-side theories could be useful to explore 
religious trends in Europe but less so for the rest of the world. This conjecture is 
                                                 
15 The supply-side theory indicates that rreligious diversity would stimulate churches to produce religious 
services well adapted to the needs of religious consumers, thereby increasing ‘consumption’ (See 
Iannaccone, 1991; Fink and Stark 1988, 1992; and Fink and Iannaccone, 1993).   14
compatible with the US case, which has both the highest levels of religious pluralism 
and one of the highest rates of church attendance (e.g. Warner, 1993). Although the 
connection between our study and previous ones is not straightforward: while we study 
convert-out they explore church attendance.  
Interestingly, the existence of a state-religion is never significant. Finally, national 
“religious capital”, that is, living in a country with higher national averages of church 
attendance levels, has a negative effect on disaffiliation.  
Surprisingly, the national average of praying affects conversion-out within the male 
sample only. Consumption motives (churches are places where people can socialize) 
and professional motives (churches serve as social networks – see Durkheim, 1995) are 
still relevant for subjects and therefore, they affect individuals’ decisions of whether to 
convert-out or stay. Indeed, Figure 1 (on the right) shows a clear negative correlation 
between national church attendance and converting-out. 
In contrast to Weberian ideas, we find that national economic development (captured by 
per-capita GDP) is uncorrelated with converting-out (the odds-ratios are equal to 1 and 
insignificant). 
Regarding personal attributes, we see that the religious denomination the respondent 
was raised in (Catholic as the reference) plays an interesting role: all denominations are 
more prone to “keep” members than Catholics. Additionally, denomination effects are 
larger for males. Interestingly, individuals raised in the Jewish, Moslem (for males) and 
Orthodox denominations have the lowest tendency to convert-out (odds ratio <0.30). 
Subjects raised as Protestants (for males) also have lower prospects of disaffiliation. 
Exposure to homogeneous and more intensive religious practice, currently, and more 
importantly, during childhood, leads to a lower tendency to convert-out and move to the 
'no religion' sector: Respondents who grew up with parents who shared the same 
religious denomination are less prone to convert-out (odds ratios of about 0.6 for   15
women and 0.4 for men); experiencing intensive church attendance at the age of 12 
further reduces the probability of men (but not women) to convert-out (odds ratio of 
about 0.8). Similar results were found for the European subsample.
16 
The literature reports mixed evidence regarding the effect of exposure to religiosity on 
secularization. The notion that childhood socialization factors can predict religion-
switching is still open to debate.
17 Loveland (2003), who used the 1988 General Social 
Survey (GSS), found that joining a church while growing up acted to stabilize religious 
preferences, but greater levels of childhood religious socialization (measured by 
attendance of a religious school; Sunday school attendance; and saying grace before 
meals)
18 were not significant deterrents of religious switching (page 152). Sherkat 
(1991) reached similar conclusions regarding the attendance of Sunday Schools and 
other formal child religious training – they did not reduce the likelihood of religious 
switching. Bibby (2000) presented data supporting the positive effect of a 
heterogeneous household on secularization: the Canadian Census data for 1991, showed 
(for example) that while only six percent of children to parents who were both Christian 
had no religious affiliation, the share rose to 31% if the children were raised by parents 
with mixed Catholic-Jewish affiliations. Our data only support attendance effects for 
men but not for women.
  
.................Insert Table 2 about here........................ 
Personal socio-economic endowments have a minor effect on secularization. Current 
age (that represents cohort effects) is significant for those older than 46: older 
                                                 
16 Brañas-Garza and Neuman (2007) studied the effect of parental attendance (when the responders were 
12 years old) on current fertility decisions in Italy and Spain. They found an interesting crossed effect: 
fathers’ churchgoing is relevant for daughters but not for sons.  
17 Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin et al. (2004) are example of economic approaches to cultural 
(parental) transmission. 
18 Sherkat and Wilson (1995) used the concept 'adaptive preferences' and claimed that socialization 
through childhood religious practice will create preferences upon which later religious choices will be 
made. It follows that more exposure to childhood religious socialization will decrease the likelihood of 
secularization later on in life.   16
respondents had a lower tendency to convert-out. Education has a negative effect for 
women only.
19 
Liberal beliefs are significantly correlated with the probability to convert-out: Liberal 
views over extramarital sex relations and homosexual relations increase the probability 
of converting-out and it’s larger for women. Identical effects were found within the 
European subsample. 
Similar effects are observed regarding the lack of beliefs in the religious doctrines of 
heaven and miracles. Most of the effects seem to be stronger for men.  
There are strong marriage effects, related to the spouse's religious affiliation: 
Individuals who share the same denomination as their spouse’s have much lower odds 
of conversion-out (odds ratios around 0.4), while those married to a spouse with 'no 
religion' have much higher odds of conversion-out (odd ratios for over 4 for women and 
over 6 for men)
20. These results are in line with findings reported in studies on similar 
topics: Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers (2001), who used an event history analysis (based 
on retrospective data containing information on events that took place in the lives of the 
respondents since adolescence), found that in The Netherlands the most significant 
factor in an attempt to explain disaffiliation was having a partner who does not belong 
to a religious group. Respondents whose partners were non-members of the church were 
                                                 
19 Roof (1989), based on GSS 1988, found that religion switchers tended to be male and well educated. A 
closely related topic is the relationship between education and religious attendance. It appears that it 
fluctuates highly among countries: In the United States, church attendance rises with education 
(Iannaccone, 1998). Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001), who examined 69 countries using the General Social 
Survey (GSS) 1972-1998, reported that in England and France they found a positive relationship. 
However, in most countries there was no significant relationship between education and religious 
attendance, whereas in the former socialist countries the connection was generally strongly negative. Te 
Grotenhuis and Scheepers (2001) and Brañas-Garza and Neuman (2004) arrived at insignificant 
coefficients of schooling in mass participation equations for the Netherlands and Spain, respectively.  
20 What we find is a positive relationship between disaffiliation of the respondent and the affiliation of 
her/his spouse that has 'no religion'. We do not have information on the date of disaffiliation of the 
respondent (and his spouse if the spouse is also with 'no religion'), whether it was before or after 
marriage. It is therefore not possible to distinguish between cause and effect: Perhaps the subjects 
converted-out when single, and then, naturally, married someone with a 'no religion' affiliation. 
Regarding marriage effects see Lehrer (1998). 
   17
12 times more likely to become non-members themselves compared to respondents with 
a religiously affiliated partner. Voas (2003) found that in Britain, religious affiliation 
tends to be lost following marriage to someone from a different religion. 
4   Concluding Remarks 
Using ISSP-1998 data, this paper explored the determinants of religious disaffiliation, 
that is, determinants of individuals who were raised in a particular religion and 
currently define their religious affiliation as ‘no religion’. Our Logit regressions 
employed a large array of explanatory variables: country specific variables, personal 
attributes and marriage characteristics. It was found that the tendency of individuals to 
leave their religion is: 
i)  strongly correlated with the religious features of their country: pluralism and 
national church attendance; 
ii)  strongly correlated with the spouse's religious characteristics; 
iii)  highly correlated with beliefs and personal views; 
iv)  but, only marginally correlated with personal socio-economic features. 
To conclude, our paper largely supports the conjecture that national aggregates of 
religiosity may affect individual decision making: subjects living in secular and in 
religiously pluralistic countries are more prone to disaffiliate and therefore, they also 
increase the probability of other subjects to leave their religion. 
Moreover the fact that a spouse with 'no religion' might accelerate the process of 
disaffiliation further intensifies the process. Given that the probability of finding a 
spouse with 'no religion' is larger in religiously pluralistic countries, means that the 
individual and national channels are inter-wined, both leading to an increase in 
disaffiliation.  
   18
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics, 1998 
 
 All  countries  Europe 
  Female  Male Female Male 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE           
Converted-out (%)  9.2  13.5  10.4  15.7 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES        
COUNTRY VARIABLES        
European country (%)  79.6  78.0  -  - 
Pluralism index (range of 0-1)  0.37 (0.25)  0.37 (0.25)  0.33 (0.24)  0.34 (0.24) 
State-religion (%)  32.4  31.7  35.0  34.8 
Country church attendance (levels 1-6)   2.16 (0.78)  2.14 (0.77)  2.11 (0.76)  2.08 (0.76) 
Country prayer (levels 1-11)  5.60 (1.58)  5.56 (1.59)  5.41 (1.39)  5.34 (1.38) 








PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES        
Religious denomination  
(raised in)                                     Catholic (%)  56.9  55.1  61.4  59.4 
Jewish (%)  4.3  4.3  0.1  0.2 
Moslem (%)  0.9  1.4  0.6  1.0 
Protestant (%)  27.8  28.6  27.4  28.6 
Orthodox (%)  7.7  7.4  9.7  9.5 
Other Christian  (%)  1.3  1.6  0.6  0.9 
Other non Christian (%)  1.1  1.6  0.2  0.4 
        
Religiously homogamous household (%)  90.0  90.8  91.7  92.1 
Intensive church attendance at 12 (%)  56.8  50.6  56.5  49.9 
        
Age categories                                    30 (%)  18.0 12.0  17.6  11.8 
31-45 (%)  35.8  32.6  35.3  32.5 
46-59 (%)  25.4  27.9  25.3  27.5 
60 (%)  20.9 27.5  21.8  28.1 
        
Last school attended               Elementary (%)  25.1 24.4  27.5  26.0 
High School (%)  39.7  39.5  38.6  39.1 
 Academic (%)  35.2 36.1  33.9  34.9 
        
“Extramarital sex relations” - liberal view (%)  12.2  17.8  14.1  19.9 
“Homosexual relations” - liberal view (%)  37.9  31.4  40.4  33.8 
        
“Does not believe in”                    Heaven (%)  18.6  28.3  20.9  31.8 
Hell (%)  28.7  35.6  31.9  39.7 
Miracles (%)  19.9  28.3 21.4 30.7 
MARRIAGE ATTRIBUTES        
Married (%)  85.6  89.2 83.9 88.1 
Spouse has same religion as respondent was 
raised in (%)  79.4 81.9  79.5  81.6 
Spouse has 'no religion' (%)  7.2  5.8  7.4  6.4 
        
Sample Size  7895  7258 6287 5660 
 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 2: Logit Regressions of Disaffiliation (Odds Ratios), 1998 
 
   All  countries  Europe 
   Female  Male  Female  Male 
COUNTRY SPECIFIC VARIABLES 
a) Religious strictness        
  Residence in a European 
country
1.41 (0.013) 1.65 (0.000) - - 
  Pluralism index 3.49 (0.000) 2.68 (0.000)  5.99 (0.000)  4.22 (0.000) 
  State-religion 0.86 (0.318) 0.96 (0.782) 1.00 (0.983)  1.09 (0.497) 
b)Religious adherence       
   Country aver. Mass 0.39 (0.000) 0.68 (0.005) 0.45 (0.000)  0.74 (0.029) 
  Country aver. pray 0.95 (0.405) 0.88 (0.037) 0.91 (0.208)  0.90 (0.091) 
c)GDP/1000  0.99 (0.477) 0.99 (0.333)  1.00 (0.955)  1.00 (0.907) 
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES 
a) Religious (raised in)          
    Denomination                   Catholic  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
  Jewish 0.15 (0.010) 0.08 (0.000) -  1.95 (0.395) 
  moslem 0.48 (0.344) 0.17 (0.006) 0.22 (0.144)  0.11 (0.004) 
  Protestant 0.85 (0.154) 0.52 (0.000) 0.73 (0.016)  0.45 (0.000) 
  Orthodox 0.25 (0.000) 0.23 (0.000) 0.23 (0.000)  0.22 (0.000) 
  Other Christian  0.62 (0.235) 0.57 (0.093) 0.93 (0.886)  0.71 (0.379) 
  Other nonChristian 0.97 (0.939) 0.81 (0.572) 1.51 (0.531)  1.01 (0.989) 
     
Religiously homogamous household 0.62 (0.000) 0.44 (0.000) 0.64 (0.001)  0.39 (0.000) 
Intensive church attendance at 12 0.99 (0.897) 0.80 (0.020) 1.02 (0.861)  0.76 (0.008) 
b)Socio-demographic attributes               
Age categories                         30 Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
31-45 0.79 (0.063) 0.92 (0.551) 0.75 (0.039)  0.90 (0.473) 
46-59 0.60 (0.000) 0.68 (0.009) 0.61 (0.001)  0.71 (0.029) 
60  0.43 (0.000) 0.50 (0.000) 0.43 (0.000)  0.52 (0.000) 
      
Last school attended     Elementary  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
High School  0.67 (0.006) 0.94 (0.664) 0.73 (0.034)  1.04 (0.740) 
 Academic  0.76 (0.059) 1.03 (0.788) 0.75 (0.058)  1.07 (0.604) 
c)Beliefs          
Liberal view over extra-marital sex 1.69 (0.000) 1.34 (0.004) 1.67 (0.000)  1.41 (0.001) 
Liberal view over homosexual 
relations
1.95 (0.000) 1.67 (0.000) 1.87 (0.000)  1.64 (0.000) 
Does not believe in Heaven 2.79 (0.000) 3.12 (0.000) 2.86 (0.000)  2.75 (0.000) 
Does not believe in Hell 1.00 (0.984) 0.87 (0.423) 0.95 (0.642)  0.93 (0.662) 
Does not believe in Miracles 1.91 (0.000) 2.41 (0.000) 1.91 (0.000)  2.45 (0.000) 
MARRIAGE EFFECTS 
 Married 0.60(0.000)  0.74(0.017)  0.59 (0.000)  0.78 (0.070) 
Spouse has same religion as 
respondent was raised in
0.39 (0.000) 0.36 (0.000) 0.41 (0.000)  0.37 (0.000) 
Spouse has 'no religion' 4.54 (0.000) 5.70 (0.000) 4.51 (0.000)  5.69 (0.000) 
  SAMPLE SIZE 7895  7258  6287  5660 
  Log-likelihood -1629.58 -1916.16  -1426.48  -1669.72 
p-values in parenthesis 
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Table 3: Summary of Regression Results: Effects of Explanatory Variables on the 
Probability to Convert-Out 
 
 
(+) effects  (-) effects 
 
1)  Country effects 
 
Residence in a European country National  churchgoing 
Pluralism  
 
2)  Personal attributes 
 
Liberal views  Religious denominations  
  Homogamous parental households 
Religious disbeliefs  Church attendance at 12 (males) 
 Age>46 
  
                Education (females) 
 
3)  Marriage effects 
 
Spouse has 'no religion'  Married 
  Spouse same religion 
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Figure 1: Converting-Out as a Function of Pluralism & Church Attendance  
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